

Part I:

History, Theory, and Method

Chapter 1

Constitutional Anomie

*The constitution of the UK lives on, changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be constitutional also.*¹

Democracies around the world exist in a constant process of adaptation and change. Although severe crises, such as war, disease, or natural disasters may provoke ‘mega-political’ change in the sense of a fundamental shift in the principles and institutional structures through which a country is governed, the general pattern of democratic evolution is based upon incremental shifts in the nature of a democracy. This stability is rooted in institutional and cultural path-dependencies that tend to ensure that reforms are designed and implemented within a fairly narrow-bounded rationality. Put slightly differently, most democracies possess, either implicitly or explicitly, a form of constitutional morality which define the key principles or values underlying the distribution of powers and political relationships within that country. This constitutional morality provides a form of socio-political roots or glue that, in turn, shape and mould not only institutional arrangements, but also reform proposals.

For centuries the United Kingdom (UK) was regarded as the ‘Mother of Democracy’ and its institutional framework and socio-political culture were exported along colonial channels throughout the world. Its constitutional morality was clear and broadly accepted—it was a power-hoarding or majoritarian form of democracy. And yet at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the nature and future of democracy in the UK are highly contested. The election of New Labour in 1997 led to the introduction of a number of constitutional reforms that have been interpreted as deconstructing, even ‘vandalising’, the UK’s traditional Westminster Model democracy.² It is this debate that forms the context for this book.

1.1 Aims and arguments

This book seeks to gauge and understand the manner in which the nature of democracy in the UK altered after the election of New Labour in 1997, and is therefore a piece of constitutional political analysis. It achieves this by drawing on the tools, language, and methods of comparative political science in order to plot the degree and direction of democratic change. More specifically, it draws upon Lijphartian political analysis in order to provide a sharper account of New Labour's statecraft in relation to constitutional reform and democratic renewal. Sharper in the sense that the contemporary nature of democracy in the UK cannot be captured in simplistic statements concerning a shift from one democratic model to another, but must instead be interpreted and understood through a lens that is sensitive to the existence of parallel and incongruent models of democracy. Indeed, it is the tension or grating between these coexisting and competing forms of democracy, intended as they are to deliver quite different governing principles, that explains many of the current challenges within domestic politics and emerging frameworks of multilevel governance.

In order to understand the manner in which New Labour approached the topic of constitutional reform and democratic renewal, and therefore how the UK came to be institutionally configured, it is necessary to appreciate both the political tradition in the UK and the historical mentality of the Labour Party. In this sense, New Labour came to power in 1997 within a context that was to some degree path-dependant. This created a critical tension for the government between their pre-election rhetoric of 'fundamental' or 'radical' constitutional change, and their post-election determination to retain the power of a strong state in order to protect their governing capacity in terms of driving-through new policies and ensuring delivery. New Labour responded to this tension in a typically British manner: by 'muddling through' in the sense of ad hoc pragmatic responses to specific challenges, but without any clear statement of overall intent or principled foundation. 'Muddling through', however, can be interpreted as an inadequate response to the challenges of modern governance at the cusp of the twenty-first century. Instead of reconnecting the governed and the governors or revitalizing politics, the available data and survey evidence suggest that trust in traditional politics, politicians, and political institutions appears to have declined during 1997–2007. It is in explaining why such a significant number of constitutional reforms

should have failed to rebuild public trust in politics that this book is concerned.

The focus of the explanation offered in this book rests on the distinction (or gap) between *rhetorical principles* and *governing practice* and combines to generate a clear thesis concerning what is termed 'constitutional anomie'. Constitutional anomie in this context relates to the manner in which New Labour failed to offer an explicit account of what they were seeking to achieve in the sphere of democratic reform, or why measures were viewed as legitimate and acceptable in some areas or in relation to some issues but not others. Put simply, between 1997 and 2007 the Labour governments of Tony Blair suffered from constitutional anomie, and a series of reforms were implemented with little appreciation of: (a) what (in the long run) the government was seeking to achieve; (b) how reform in one sphere of the constitution would have obvious and far-reaching consequences for other elements of the constitutional equilibrium; or (c) any detailed analysis of the nature or model of democracy that existed towards the end of the twentieth century and particularly after eighteen years of Conservative government.

Prime Minister Tony Blair made no speeches on the constitution and a white paper on the constitution was never forthcoming. Blair was never a constitutional entrepreneur with a driving passion for change or a clear vision of what a reformed model of democracy in the UK would look like. The Lord Chancellor for much of this period, Lord Irvine, responded to criticisms that the reform programme was disjointed and opaque in terms of under-pinning values by stating that the government had no intention of 'returning to first principles'. 'Cobbled together on the back of an envelope' may well have been Hennessy's apt description of constitutional design and reform in the UK, but it arguably reached its zenith during 2001–5 as a lack of consultation, inadequate preparatory work, and poor media management led to the government being perceived as floundering, ill-prepared, overhasty, and, at times, simply shoddy in relation to constitutional reform.

It is this accusation of constitutional anomie that provides the context or backcloth on which this book is written. The central question this book seeks to answer—and therefore around which its theoretical and empirical arguments revolve—is how exactly did New Labour alter the nature of democracy in the UK during 1997–2007?

In this context, the publication of the *Governance of Britain* green paper in July 2007, just weeks after Tony Blair resigned and was replaced by Gordon Brown marks a significant point in the constitutional history of

the UK.³ As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown had always been more sensitive to the existence and implications of constitutional anomie, and during the government's second term (2001–5) he signalled his anxieties in a number of speeches and statements in which he called for a 'new constitutional settlement'.⁴ *Governance of Britain* can therefore be located within a broader narrative concerning the evolution and future of democracy. In terms of style there is a distinct change of emphasis in two clear ways: first, there is an explicit engagement and willingness to promote a discussion about the primary values and principles that should underpin the UK's constitutional arrangements; and, second, there is an emphasis on broad consultation in relation to both underpinning values and elements of 'unfinished business' (electoral reform for the House of Commons, reform of the second chamber, etc.). However, the green paper also provides an intriguing glance into the executive mentality and particularly how members of the government and senior civil servants frame certain issues in terms of key questions. In this regard it is possible to suggest that the document is misdirected. The foreword by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and Secretary of State for Justice and the Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, states that the *Governance of Britain* is focused on two fundamental questions:

1. How should we hold power accountable?
2. How should we uphold and enhance the rights and responsibilities of the citizen?

However, it is possible to suggest that these two questions continue to suggest a degree of constitutional anomie because they are secondary or meso-level questions that can only be answered once broader macro-political questions regarding what sort of democracy, what specific model or form, we are seeking to evolve towards have been settled. Put slightly differently, there are many ways of holding power to account and there are many mechanisms through which rights and responsibilities can be entrenched and secured but these variations tend to flow—like branches from a tree—from the specific form of democracy (parliamentary, presidential, majoritarian, consociational) deployed within that polity. Adopting the metaphor of a journey, the government's questions are akin to discussing what form of transport we might use (train, bus, plane, tram, etc.) before we have decided where we want to go. Following this line of argument it is possible to suggest that if the government is truly committed to forging 'a new relationship between government and citizen, and beginning the journey towards a new constitutional settlement' then

a more constructive approach would take a more expansive and grounded stance by asking two quite different questions:

1. What kind of constitution and democracy do we have in the UK at the beginning of the twenty-first century?
2. What are we attempting to achieve through the reform process?

These questions are clearly interrelated as answering the second requires at least some attempt at resolving the first. Both questions also involve normative and empirical dimensions which, in turn, force us to consider the tools of political analysis, and particularly those that offer the capacity to assess the *sum impact* of a series of constitutional measures. This raises epistemological and methodological questions concerning the concepts, theories, and frameworks through which it is possible to deduce *subtle, moderate, or fundamental* changes in a democratic system. However, the significance of these questions of political analysis and the need for explicitly theorized systematic research on the impact/legacy of reforms during 1997–2007 is demonstrated not just by the current Labour government's position on constitutional reform, but also by the failure of the now burgeoning academic literature on this topic to come to any sort of shared conclusion about the impact of these measures.

A clear polarization of opinion can be identified within the scholarly analysis between those who have interpreted New Labour's impact on the constitution as fundamental and those more sceptical observers who view the very same reforms as involving a far less radical, even cosmetic effect on democracy in the UK. In this context Peter Mair observes, 'New Labour is currently engaged in what amounts to a full-blooded constitutional revolution, dragging the political system away from an extreme version of majoritarian democracy towards a more institutionally consensual model' while Mark Evans rejects such an interpretation and argues that 'Third Way democracy is elite democracy in disguise'.⁵ This polarization of opinion is intriguing because it forces us to reflect on the methods and tools of political analysis that can be utilized in order to tease apart and disentangle a complex patchwork of reforms, and thereby reveal the underlying drivers or consequences of this process.

This vast body of work provides the backdrop against which this book stands. The central epistemological and methodological argument of this book is that a binary distinction between consensual or majoritarian models of democracy is inappropriate because it fails to reflect the true complexity that currently exists. As a result this book develops the concept of 'meta-constitutional orientations' in order to argue that the distinctive

element of New Labour's approach to constitutional engineering is not that it has shifted the nature of democracy in the UK from one model to another, but that it has sought to apply different models at the periphery and core: bi-constitutionality. Revealing the existence of overlapping or intertwined models of democracy provides a sharper understanding of the realities of modern governance through which it is possible to understand the polarization of academic opinion and many of the key challenges facing democracy in the UK.

In order to provide depth (in terms of a conceptual and theoretical framework) and breadth (in terms of a structure through which it is possible to identify the interrelationship between specific reforms) this book utilizes Arend Lijphart's framework for measuring patterns of democracy.⁶ This contributes a deeper understanding and more fundamental analysis to the broader debate about how the constitution and nature of democracy has altered in the UK since May 1997. It therefore provides a way of teasing apart and understanding the roots of the academic debate on the cumulative impact of New Labour's reforms and through this provide an answer to the first question mentioned earlier ('What kind of constitution and democracy do we have in the UK at the beginning of the twenty-first century?'), that will itself aid our understanding of the trajectory of UK politics and from this provide a clearer foundation and basis from which to debate the second question ('What are we attempting to achieve through the reform process?').

Briefly focusing on this latter question at this early stage is useful for a number of reasons, but not least because it encourages us to reflect on New Labour's original aims and ambitions and then consider the degree to which they have been achieved. This then sets out the broader context or background within which not only *Governance of Britain* was published by the government in July 2007, but also within which the research in this book was conducted. It is for this reason that Section 1.2 focuses on the analysis of levels of public trust in politics.

1.2 The Democratic legacy, 1997–2007

In January 2006, the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Harriet Harman, emphasized that '[A] healthy democracy is one that has the active engagement of its citizens. Our democracy lacks legitimacy if, whatever the formal rules about universal suffrage and the right to vote, people don't make it a reality by turning out to vote'.⁷ The Minister went on to lament

the contemporary existence of 'democracy deserts' in the UK where high-levels of social exclusion are compounded by low-levels of democratic engagement. If we adopt the minister's emphasis on electoral turnout as a reflective indicator of a healthy democracy, then we can observe from the result of the 2005 General Election that democracy is not very healthy in the UK, and that major questions exist concerning its legitimacy. The Labour government won just 35.2 per cent of the popular vote, which was translated by the simple-plurality electoral system into 55 per cent of seats (355, a majority of 65). Not only was this the lowest share of the vote won by any governing party since 1923, but it was also the lowest share of the popular vote of any party to gain a majority in modern times.

In this context Gordon Brown's core message—'I will restore trust in politics'—during his leadership campaign in May 2007, an emphasis that was widely interpreted as an implicit criticism of Tony Blair's period in office, is significant. Rebuilding public trust and confidence in politics was a defining ambition of New Labour. In 1996 Tony Blair emphasized the need to 'construct a new and radical politics to serve the people in the new century ahead . . . where power is pushed down to the people instead of being hoarded centrally'.⁸ This emphasis formed part of the broader 'Third Way' narrative whereby 'reform of the state and government should be a basic orientating principle—a process of the deepening and widening of democracy'⁹ or what Anthony Giddens would later refer to as 'a second wave of democratization . . . the democratization of democracy'.¹⁰ The Labour Party manifesto for the 1997 General Election declared, 'We shall fight the general election *inter alia* on democratic renewal as an essential element in our project: the modernization of Britain'.

If the central aim of New Labour was to rebuild public trust and confidence in politics then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it has been unsuccessful. In coming to this conclusion it is sufficient to draw upon three authoritative sources. First, the Electoral Commission's annual audit of political engagement provides a detailed barometer of public opinion vis-à-vis trust, confidence, and satisfaction with politics. Although the statistics are generally fairly stable between each of the four years (2003–7) the baseline is not very impressive. In the latest audit only 27 per cent of the public trusted politicians generally, and 33 per cent thought 'the present political system of governing works well'.¹¹ These findings complement those of the Hansard Society's audits which reveal very little public knowledge or public interest in constitutional issues. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the Hansard Society's audits suggest that although public satisfaction with politics is higher than it was in the mid-1990s

Democratic Drift




Figure 1.1 Public Attitudes on the political system in the UK, 1973–2008

Source: Hansard Society (2008) *Audit of Political Engagement* 5 London, p. 37.

before New Labour were elected, it has subsequently waned to the point at which only 32 per cent are generally satisfied with the status quo.

The British Social Attitude Survey's longitudinal research on public attitudes also provides a rich vein of data on the public's attitude to politics that chimes with the findings of other surveys. The most recent British Attitudes Survey indicates a decline in public trust in politicians and political institutions. In 2008, the proportion of the public who simply do not trust the government to put the interests of the country above those of their party increased to its highest level (33.6%) since the data set began in 1986. The ESRC's Democracy and Participation Programme provides a final source of detailed quantitative and qualitative data on public attitudes that helps us dissect and understand the issue in greater detail. This research reveals that the public are not disinterested with politics per se, but they are lacking in trust when it comes to the motivations of politicians, and are increasingly utilizing non-traditional forms of political participation and engagement. Non-traditional in the sense that instead of voting, joining a political party, or contacting their MP members of the public, especially young people are likely to engage in quite different activities, like consumer involvement in buying

or boycotting products or events in order to express their opinion.¹² In short, they are likely to choose channels of influence that lie beyond the traditional representative politics and those which are more single-interest, direct, and possibly reliant on new forms of technology. In short, the evidence suggests that New Labour's constitutional reforms have failed to reconnect the governed with the governors. Levels of public distrust and disengagement remain high. This was the driving force behind the Independent Inquiry into Britain's Democracy (*The Power Report*) in 2006 and which led Colin Hay, in his influential 2007 book *Why We Hate Politics*, to state quite simply that 'Politics is a dirty word'.¹³

The data and evidence of heightened public distrust of politicians and political institutions alongside a more general sense of public apathy and disengagement, particularly among certain social groups, during 1997–2007 is fundamental in relation to this book's focus on constitutional anomie. Although the UK is by no means unique amongst advanced liberal democracies in being a 'disaffected democracy', the available data do pose distinct questions about the nature and manner in which New Labour approached the issue of constitutional reform and democratic renewal. The absence of any clear underlying logic or variables combined with evidence that the government was committed to a far-reaching shift in the nature of democracy in *principle but not in practice* alienated large sections of the public and reinforced existing beliefs about the trustworthiness of politicians. Constitutional anomie therefore eviscerated the potential rewards of reform in terms of rebuilding trust because it confused the public in terms of the driving logic or consequences of each specific measure as well as frequently cultivating an image of a government constantly devolving power with one hand, only to claw it back through the imposition of exemptions, opt-outs, or ministerial veto at the implementation stage. This last point reveals the existence of what commentators have labelled the 'Blair paradox', and it is exactly this paradox which forms an important explanatory variable behind the constitutional anomie thesis. In order to set out how this book underpins its arguments concerning constitutional anomie, bi-constitutionalism, and the changing of democracy in the UK, Section 1.3 outlines the structure of this book.

1.3 Structure

Gordon Brown's first steps as Prime Minister have been anchored to the idea of restoring trust in politics. That is, restoring public confidence

in the integrity, vitality, and capacity of the agents, institutions, and processes of *conventional* representative politics.¹⁴ This restored emphasis on trust is a direct response to the erosion of public trust and increase in disenchantment that occurred during the final years of New Labour. This book examines Brown's constitutional inheritance and provides a framework for mapping and considering future options. It is divided into three parts and sixteen chapters. The core arguments of each chapter and how they combine to offer a distinctive account of constitutional reform and democratic renewal in the UK can be summarized as follows:

(Chapter 1)—During 1997–2007, the constitution of the UK was modified, but not fundamentally reformed. New Labour suffered from constitutional anomie due predominantly to intra-executive confusion regarding what it was seeking to achieve.



(Chapter 2)—The 'Blair paradox' reflects not a simple shift in orientations (i.e. from majoritarian power-hoarding to consensual power-sharing) but a multifaceted attempt to inject a new meta-constitutional orientation, in terms of a set of core values, principles, and assumptions about the distribution of power and the relationship between political actors, *within* the existing version (i.e. bi-constitutionalism).



(Chapter 3)—The Labour Party has traditionally been aligned with a power-hoarding model of democracy, and its rhetorical commitment to constitutional reform in the mid-1990s was largely an *act-contingent* strategy to win power.



(Chapter 4)—The political studies community in the UK has traditionally adopted a distinctive and insular approach, in terms of theory and methods, to constitutional research, but there is a pressing need to embrace alternative tools of political analysis. This book utilizes Lijphartian political analysis in order to inject a more theoretically driven account of change.



(Chapter 5)—There is no such thing as *the* party system in the UK, but an embryonic multilevelled hierarchy of party *systems*. The existence of different party systems, founded and perpetuated by electoral systems that have been designed to inculcate a quite different value-set, raises

questions about the long-term stability of the polity, while also providing the first empirical evidence of a bi-constitutional statecraft.



(Chapter 6)—Although cabinet government remains closely aligned with minimal-winning single-party executives at the national level, the situation at the sub-national level is more complex as formal and informal factors conspire to ensure that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception.



(Chapter 7)—The relationship between the executive and legislature at the national level remains heavily weighted in favour of the government, but a far more balanced relationship is observable at the sub-national level.



(Chapter 8)—The politics of electoral reform under New Labour provides a critical case of marginalization and strategic manoeuvring in order to avoid shifting to a more proportional electoral system. And yet devolution was founded on variants of more proportional system which leaves the national system in an anomalous position.



(Chapter 9)—The traditional relationship between Labour governments and trade unions shifted during 1997–2007 from the ‘union-party bonding model’ to a ‘union-distance model’. The creation of new political spaces and democratic arenas through devolution, however, has increased the number of linkages in the democratic chain, thereby creating new conduits through which interest groups can play a role in the policy making process.



(Chapter 10)—The federal–unitary dimension of politics altered significantly during 1997–2007. Devolution was, however, implemented within the contours of the Westminster Model and has also overlooked by far the largest component of the UK—England. The asymmetrical nature of devolution and the existence of anomalies and dynamic tensions complement arguments concerning constitutional anomie.



(Chapter 11)—Reform of the House of Lords provides critical insights not just into the nature of New Labour’s statecraft, but also into the challenges of constitutional political analysis. This chapter examines empirical and analytical debates and concludes that change on the Index of Bicameralism has been marginal.

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(Chapter 12)—Although other countries generally require special majorities, popular referendums, or other safeguards to ensure that the constitution remains protected from day-to-day partisan manipulation, the constitution of the UK is notable due to the absence of these auxiliary precautions. New Labour did little to dilute their capacity in terms of constitutional amendment.

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(Chapter 13)—The logic of legal constitutionalism promotes the role of judges as external regulators of political behaviour. It therefore seeks to increase the degree of constitutional rigidity by seeking to locate some basic rights, values, or principles beyond the reach of elected politicians. New Labour sought to embrace elements of legal constitutionalism while maintaining a ‘political constitution’. The outcome is a confused and anomalous element of the broader bi-constitutionality argument.

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(Chapter 14)—Throughout the twentieth century the view was taken by consecutive governments that the UK’s constitution was incompatible with the concept of central bank independence. New Labour departed from this position and instead sought to square the circle by granting independence but within the contours of the Westminster Model.

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(Chapter 15)—Updating Lijphart’s analysis reveals that New Labour attempted to create a multilevel polity based upon a more consensual model of democracy *within* an increasingly frail conception of the Westminster Model (i.e. modified majoritarianism) at the national level. A statecraft strategy based upon constitutional coexistence and the parallel operation of markedly different models of democracy is likely to prove highly unstable within a unitary state.

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(Chapter 16) At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, democracy in the UK is drifting. No political party seems able to articulate what constitutional reform is for anymore, and in this context stimulating debates about ‘Britishness’, citizenship, or a ‘common statement of values’ might, therefore, be regarded as weak and oblique responses to the challenges of constitutional anomie set out in this book.

The simple conclusion of this book is that democracy in the UK is drifting. Drifting in the sense that reforms have been implemented with no vision of what exactly the government is trying to achieve, little in

terms of a coherent set of principles, or an explanation of why many of the reforms appear to pull in quite different directions. More broadly, at the beginning of the twenty-first century nobody seems able to articulate as to what actually is meant by constitutional reform. In this sense, the UK is suffering from an illness known as constitutional anomie, and neither the Labour government's *Governance of Britain* initiative or the Conservative Party's plans, combined with the behaviour of politicians, appears to be able to respond to this diagnosis. Constitutional anomie is a debilitating illness. Its symptoms include the introduction of reforms in a manner bereft of any underlying logic or explicit principles, combined with the inability to adopt a strategic approach which is sensitive to the interrelated nature of any constitutional configuration. Constitutional anomie is therefore an ailment of both mental and physical health vis-à-vis the body politic. Social and political anxiety, confusion, and frustration emerge with the result that reforms that were designed to enhance levels of public trust and confidence in politics, politicians, and political institutions can actually have the opposite effect. The prognosis for constitutional anomie depends on a complex range of factors but not least on the creation of specific anomalies and inconsistencies that are likely to augment to the point at which the pressure for more fundamental measures and the articulation of a revised constitutional morality becomes inevitable.

This book is of methodological importance, not simply because it assesses the cumulative impact of recent reforms through the application of Lijphart's methodological and conceptual framework, but because it critically reflects on the utility of this tool of political analysis and from this criticizes the existing body of literature on constitutional reform in the UK since 1997. It is of conceptual importance because the results of the systematic analysis add further weight to the accusation of constitutional anomie while also allowing the development of a new conceptual tool, namely bi-constitutionality, which offers significant analytical leverage in terms of understanding longstanding debates, such as the 'Blair paradox'. This book is of normative importance because it avoids the descriptive-prescriptive approach to constitutional literature that has dominated political studies in the UK throughout the twentieth century, and it is relevant for comparative politics because it replicates and takes forward a methodology that has been applied around the world and in doing so provides a critical case of executive-politics and statecraft vis-à-vis constitutional reform.

Notes

1. Griffiths, J A G (1979) 'The Political Constitution', *Modern Law Review*, 42(1), 19.
2. 'New Labour' for the purposes of this book relates to the period in which Tony Blair was Leader of the Party (i.e. 1994–2007).
3. Cm. 7170 *Governance of Britain*. London: HMSO.
4. See *The Guardian* 27 February 2006.
5. Mair, Peter (2000) 'Partyless Democracy: Solving the Paradox of New Labour', *New Left Review*, 2 March/April, 34; Evans, M (2003) *Constitution-Making and the Labour Party*. London: Palgrave, p. 5.
6. Lijphart, A (1984) *Democracies*. London: Yale University Press; see also Lijphart, A (1999) *Patterns of Democracy*. London: Yale University Press; Lijphart, A (2008) *Thinking About Democracy*. London: Routledge.
7. Harman, Harriet (2006) *A New Deal for Democracy*. Speech to the Hansard Society, 16 January (www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2006/sp060116.htm).
8. Blair, Anthony (1996) 'My Vision for Britain', in Giles Radice, ed, *What Needs to Change*. London: Harper Collins, p.3. See also Blair, Anthony (1996) *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country*. London: Fourth Estate; Blair, Anthony (1998) *The Third Way*. London: Fabian Society.
9. Giddens, Anthony (2000) *The Third Way and Its Critics*. Cambridge: Polity, p. 69.
10. Giddens, *The Third Way*, p. 61.
11. See Electoral Commission (2006) *An Audit of Political Engagement* 3. London: Electoral Commission, p. 7. See also Mortimore, R, Clark, J, and Pollard, N (2008) *Blair's Britain: The Political Legacy*. London: IPSOS/MORI.
12. Whiteley, Paul and Seyd, Patrick (2002). *High Intensity Participation: The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
13. Hay, Colin (2007) *Why We Hate Politics*. Cambridge: Polity, 1.
14. See Kennedy, C (2007) 'Britain After Blair: The Issue of Trust', *British Politics*, 2, 435–40.